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Abstract
The possibility of an electromagnetic (EM) side channel attack on computers
has been known since 1967. Each executed instruction/event from running a
program on a computer/laptop causes an EM signal at particular frequency.
Based on this signal, theoretically, it can be established what is happening on
the computer/laptop. In practice, no one has used EM leakage to decode in-
structions in detail or extract full information from memories if computers work
internally without exchanging information with the outside world, e.g., through
the Internet, etc. The main focus of this research is determination of the EM
leakage from a modern laptop. Three main experimental components that help
to detect the leakage are addressed: a spectrum analyzer (SA), a tracking gen-
erator, and "victim" laptop (the one which leakage is measured). All of the
research on the EM side channel attack used EM far-field probes. EM near-field
probes have been applied to this EM leakage for the first time. Studying the
characteristics of the leakage spectra from a laptop could lead to new protection
techniques and improvements for laptop-safe instruction executions. EM data
were collected in varying frequency bands, environment conditions, and running
programs. A cache hit/miss program was chosen for testing the possibility of the
EM leakage because of the highest radiation level compared with other instruc-
tions. The program was written in such a way that allows to specify and change




Computers have undergone continuous evolution for seven decades. Over time,
serious concerns about protection of information from inadvertent leakage have
increased. These concerns are among the most important because everything
is computerized in the modern world: governments, military and security orga-
nizations, airports, national laboratories, education and medical organizations,
etc.
There are numerous ways to steal computerized information. Some of them
are shared processor hardware channel attack, system software layer attack, and
side channel attack.
The example of the shared-processor hardware-channel attack is given in
Chen and Venkataramani (2014). The authors show that a Trojan horse, a type
of malware often disguised as legitimate software, modulates the timing event
on shared processor hardware. This modulation gives needed information to a
spy process. There is no direct communication between the Trojan and the Spy.
Therefore, it is difficult to detect these channel attacks. The article proposes to
check unusual events in real time.
The system software layer attack is based on incorporating vulnerabilities in
guest operating systems (OSs) used to support virtualization (Evtyushkin et al.,
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2014). In 2013, the Linux kernel alone had 189 new vulnerabilities1. One of the
ways to protect users from this attack is to apply an isolated execution (Iso-
X) which offers flexible allocation of physical memory for security-critical code
(Evtyushkin et al., 2014).
The most dangerous class of attacks is side channel attack. This type of at-
tacks does not physically connect to the computers while observing sound, EM,
etc. emanation that leak to the environment. Some side channel attacks includ-
ing timing attacks (Kocher, 1996; Coppens et al., 2009), power attacks (Kocher
et al., 1999; Bayrak et al., 2011), differential fault attacks (Biham and Shamir,
1997; Giraud, 2004), cache-based attacks (Tsunoo et al., 2002; Bangerter et al.,
2011), and branch prediction attacks (Aciiçmez et al., 2007) use malicious pro-
cedures which can affect the system or attach to the target system equipment,
and, therefore, are not as difficult to detect and prevent. However, the side chan-
nel attacks related to the emanating electromagnetic and/or sound waves from
working computers are difficult to detect. This is because such illuminations
could in principle be measured far away from computers without incorpora-
tions into computers’ software or hardware and/or buses. Therefore, a theft of
information cannot be easily detected. Acoustic attacks track the system com-
putational sound to get sensitive information. Electrical components inside the
voltage regulator on the mother board of a computer create an acoustic sound
(Genkin et al., 2017). The voltage regulator consists of a few capacitors and a
coil. When a computer operates, these components make noise. This sound can
be detected. Different CPU (central processing unit) operations give different
frequency noise. For example, in one system studied, a multiplication instruc-
tion gives about 282-kHz frequency sound, while a floating point multiplication
1http://cvedetails.com
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instruction gives about 287-kHz frequency sound (Genkin et al., 2017). Elec-
tromagnetic attacks are based on measurements and analysis of electromagnetic
radiation (van Eck, 1985; Highland, 1986; Gandolfi et al., 2001; Agrawal et al.,
2002; Sekiguchi and Seto, 2013; Callan et al., 2014; Zajić and Prvulovic, 2014).
The first report about these attacks was presented at the Spring Joint Com-
puter Conference of 1967 by Willis H. Ware2. In his report, he wrote: “It is
also possible to monitor the electromagnetic emanations that are radiated by
the high-speed electronic circuits that characterize so much of the equipment
used in computational systems. Energy given off in this form can be remotely
recorded without having to gain physical access to the system or to any of its
components or communication lines. The possibility of successful exploitation
of this technique must always be considered.” Ware classified computer network
vulnerabilities as radiation from a processor, switching equipment, and output
devices (printers and terminals), as well as radiation along the communication
lines (Figure 1.1).
In 1985, van Eck confirmed the possibility of eavesdropping on video display
units with a normal TV receiver (van Eck, 1985). In 1999, Durak detected elec-
tromagnetic leakage from a desktop’s memory system at about two-meter dis-
tance3. In 2014, Zajić and Prvulovic showed the electromagnetic leakage from
modern laptops and desktops (Zajić and Prvulovic, 2014). According to them,
the EM information leakage can be detected at distances from tens of centime-
ters to several meters regardless of obstacles like cubicle, structural walls, metal
shielding, etc. In their experiment, two types of activity were repeatedly running
with period T/2 each on a computer. The frequency of these combined activ-
ities, 1/T, was observed with a radio receiver, Tecsun PL-660. Unfortunately,




Figure 1.1: An overview of the thread points of electromagnetic attacks. Image
obtained from http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R609-1/index2.html.
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is one thing is to detect the radiation but it is much harder to decode it. This
would require some synchronization with the leaking signal and recognition of
the sequence of symbols etc.
Initial investigations for this thesis work began with measuring EM radiation
from running a Raspberry Pi B+ V1.2. This unit has a single-core 700-MHz
processor with 512 MB of memory. The processor executes 8 instructions simul-
taneously pipelined fashion. Therefore, counting cycles per instruction doesn’t
really give a picture of what actually happens. The main reason for choosing
a Raspberry Pi was its relatively low frequency processor. It was believed that
it would be easier to capture this EM leakage. Unfortunately, instructions like
double precision division, multiplication, addition, etc. did not give visible-
above-the-noise signals. L1 cache and L2 cache instructions (see Section 2.1 for
cache definition) cause powerful enough EM leakage, but this leakage was in
the frequency range out (too low) of what could be measured with the available
instruments. In higher frequency processors, cache instructions would cause EM
leakage at higher frequency. Therefore, I chose a modern laptop with a higher
frequency processor. This gave an opportunity to examine EM signal emanations
from L1 cache and L2 cache accesses.
In this thesis, results of recent papers (Zajić and Prvulovic, 2014; Callan
et al., 2014) were confirmed, for the first time, on a laptop with an Intel i7-
6700HQ processor (see Section 4.1 for more details) using only a simple near field
antenna connected to a USB-SA124A Spectrum Analyzer. The theory behind
the measurements is presented in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 describes the equipment
needed for detecting the signal from a laptop’s running program. Measurements
performed with this equipment for understanding its behavior are explained.
Chapter 4 presents a way to eavesdrop the EM signals created by a program
5
running on a "victim" laptop and illustrates the measured results. Conclusions




To demonstrate the detection of EM radiation from the laptop’s processor, a
program which can give a strong and distinguished EM signals is needed. Based
on experimental results for an EM side channel measurement in Callan et al.
(2014), a processor leaks the strongest and most distinguished signal when there
is repetitive sequence of on-chip instructions and off-chip memory accesses. This
means that instructions which are related to a cache hit/miss are the best can-
didates for this research.
2.1 Cache Hit/Miss Definition
The two main components of a computer are memory and processor. Data flow
pass to the processor from memory. The memory is not typically on the same
chip as the processor. Therefore, memory latency is relatively high (about 10
nsec). In reality, this can be up to 100s of processor cycles. Because of the high
latency, smaller memory storages, typically, level 1 (∼4-cycle latency) and level
2 (∼12-cycle latency) are implemented on the same silicon die as processor cores
(Figure 2.1). Cache is a small memory that contains the subset of the content
of the main memory. If the data that are requested are not there, it is a cache
miss. Otherwise, it is a cache hit.
7
Figure 2.1: The organization of a computer, showing the processor, caches, and
memory.
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Figure 2.2: Timing of the program.
2.2 Cache Hit/Miss Program
A program which creates cache hit/miss was given by Dr. Callan (personal
communication with R. Callan, 2016). It is the same program used in his and his
colleagues’ articles (Callan et al., 2014; Zajić and Prvulovic, 2014). According to
Zajić and Prvulovic (2014), differences in code execution create electromagnetic
signals which can be measured with simple tools. The program has two loops.
The loops have equal periods
T1 = T2 = T/2, (2.1)
where T = T1 +T2. The first loop runs for T1 seconds then the second loop runs
for T2 seconds then the sequence repeats (Figure 2.2).
When the program executes, it creates signals at frequency 1/T. I will call this
frequency the “program’s frequency” later. The code is run as a single-threaded
32-bit user mode application under a 64-bit version of Windows 7 (Callan et al.,
2014). The pseudo-code of the cache hit/miss program is shown in (Callan et al.,
2014).
In this study, during period T1, the code instructs the processor to load
from L1 cache (LDL1). This is the A instruction/event (lines 2 through 7 in
Figure 2.3). Then, during period T2, the code instructs the processor to load
from L2 cache (LDL2). This is the B instruction/event (lines 8 through 13 in
Figure 2.3). The two executions make one A/B alternation. This alternation
is repeated as long as it is needed to measure the side channel signal. Periods
A and B events are controlled by the value of inst_loop_count. To create the
9
Figure 2.3: The A/B alternation pseudo-code. Image obtained from (Callan
et al., 2014)
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desired cache hit/miss behavior, the address of the accessed location updates
repeatedly (lines 4 and 10 in Figure 2.3). To avoid the differences in EM signals
during repetitions of the experiment, all instructions outside of lines 1 through
14 (Figure 2.3) should be executed identically. Therefore, the actual code is
written in x86 assembly.
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Chapter 3
EXPERIMENTAL EQUIPMENT AND ITS
ELECTROMAGNETIC CHARACTERISTICS
In order to detect the EM leakage from a laptop, I used a spectrum analyzer
and near field EM probes (antennas). In this Section, I describe their EM char-
acteristics.
3.1 Spectrum Analyzer
3.1.1 Spectrum Analyzer and Laptop with Software for
the Spectrum Analyzer in the Far-Field Chamber
After studying the instruments, a spectrum analyzer as a digital receiver with
a single side band was chosen. It has an analog to digital (A/D) converter and
frequency downconverter; shifts frequency to base band by a selectable amount.
The selectable amount is called the center frequency. It can optionally record
time series data. This option gave the flexibility to capture and analyze the data
using Fourier analysis offline.
12
Figure 3.1: Block diagram for the measurement with the SA and a Laptop only.
For my measurements, USB-SA124A Spectrum Analyzer was chosen (De-
modulator: AM-FM-SSB-CW real time; Max. Frequency: 12.4 GHz; Min. Fre-
quency: 100 kHz; Max. Level: 10 dBm; Min. Level: -152 dBm; Min. Resolution:
1 Hz). In a far-field chamber, several measurements with this SA were done un-
der different setups. Initially, the SA was only connected to a laptop with the
software for the spectrum analyzer (Figure 3.1). This laptop was connected to
a power cord (PC in Figure 3.1) which was plugged in chamber’s outlet.
In a typical spectrum analyzer (including the SA that was used) there are
options to set the start, stop, and center frequency. The frequency halfway
between the stop and start frequencies on a spectrum analyzer display is known
as the center frequency. This is the frequency that is in the middle of the
display’s frequency axis. Span specifies the range between the start and stop
frequencies. A "Zero Span" is a span at the fix central frequency with the range
equal to the bandwidth. The center frequency and span allow for adjustment of
the display within the frequency range of the instrument to enhance visibility of
the measured spectrum1. For all measurements with the SA provided in Section
3.1, the frequency is centered at 150 kHz and “Zero Span” (time series (I and Q)
data can be collected only in "Zero Span" mode). The bandwidth was 250 kHz
and could not be controlled. In the “Zero Span” interface, “AM Demod” was
chosen. The data were recorded in comma-separated values (csv) format. The
1https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectrum_analyzer#Center_frequency_and_span
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length of the data is 486111 elements (I and Q pairs). The time of collection
was 1 sec. Therefore, the sampling frequency is
FS = 486111 Hz. (3.1)
The I and Q values are scaled to mW via software-applied corrections. FIR
filters were used to apply amplitude corrections on the data before they were
saved in csv format. Correction factors are collected and stored on each unit
before shipping to customers. Before applying the fast Fourier transform (FFT)
to the raw I and Q data obtained, the data were multiplied by a normalized Flat
Top window. Flat Top windows have very low passband ripple (< 0.01 dB) and
are used primarily for calibration purposes. Their bandwidth is approximately
2.5 times wider than a von Hann window (raised cosine). Flat top windows are
summations of cosines. The coefficients of a flat top window are computed from
the following equation2


















where 0 ≤ n ≤ N−1 and w(n) = 0 elsewhere. The window length is L = N (L =
486111 for this experiment). The coefficient values are a0 = 0.21557895, a1 =
0.41663158, a2 = 0.277263158, a3 = 0.083578947, and a4 = 0.006947368. In Fig-
ure 3.2, a 100-point normalized flat top window is shown in time and frequency
domains.
The power spectrum was computed from the data collected with the SA using
a 486111-point normalized flat top window in order to compare the power spec-
trum calculated with the software obtained power spectrum (The manufacturer
uses the 486111-point normalized flat top window).
The SA provides the time series data (I and Q) are shifted to base band. The
amount of shift is equal to the center frequency. Then the spectral value of the
2https://www.mathworks.com/help/signal/ref/flattopwin.html
14









































Figure 3.2: A 100-point normalized flat top window is shown in time and
frequency domains.
center frequency appears as DC. The power spectrum of the shifted data collected
under the setup shown in Figure 3.1 is shown in Figure 3.3. The frequencies in
ranges [-243.1, -125.25] and [125.25, 243.1] correspond to the noise. These are
enhanced after window application.
Because DC of the I and Q data correspond to the center frequency, I needed
to add this frequency to the fast Fourier transform’s (FFT) frequency in order
to have the true frequencies in my plot. This addition shifts the FFT output
(see Figure 3.4 and all other related Figures).
In Figure 3.4, we see the power spectrum of the signals that were created by
the setup shown in Figure 3.1.
There are several peaks. The highest one is at 28.56 kHz. The peak at 145.4
kHz corresponds to the center frequency. The peak at the center frequency is
due to the DC offset (the mean value of the waveform) in the SA receiver and
downconverter. As we will see later, there is always a peak near the center
frequency in the power spectrum. It is close, but never equal to the setup center
15






































Figure 3.3: Power spectrum of the output of the SA. The data were collected
under the setup shown in Figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.4: Power spectrum of the signals that were created by the setup
shown in Figure 3.1.
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frequency. All peaks related to center frequencies are a little bit shifted from
the setup values of the center frequencies. This relates to the frequency error
that exists in any spectrum analyzer. The frequency resolution is also limited
by resolution bandwidth. In order to understand the nature of other peaks, the
power spectrum for several other modifications (cases) of the block diagram are
plotted in the subsections below.
3.1.2 Shielded Spectrum Analyzer and Laptop with
Software for the Spectrum Analyzer in the
Far-Field Chamber
The SA was wrapped in a grounded aluminum foil. Everything else was the
same as the setup in Figure 3.1. In Figure 3.5, the power spectrum of the signals
from this modification is plotted. All peaks are at the same positions as they are
in Figure 3.4 only slight variations in the magnitudes are present. Therefore, I
conclude that the SA is very well shielded by itself and no additional aluminum
shielding is needed.
3.1.3 Spectrum Analyzer and an
Unplugged-from-Power-Cord Laptop with
Software for the Spectrum Analyzer in the
Far-Field Chamber
The setup is the same as in Figure 3.1, but the laptop was disconnected from
the power and the power cord was out of the chamber. In Figure 3.6, the power
spectrum of the signals from this setup is plotted. The highest peak and peak
related to the center frequency are at the same positions as they are in Figure
3.4. Two other peaks, 104 and 208 kHz, are shifted left by about 3% relative
18





































Figure 3.5: Power spectrum of signals from the shielded spectrum analyzer
(block diagram Figure 3.1, but the SA was wrapped in a grounded aluminum
foil).
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Figure 3.6: Power spectrum of signals from the spectrum analyzer (block
diagram Figure 3.1, but the laptop was disconnected from power and the power
cord was out of the chamber).
to their values when computer was connected to the power cord. I speculate
that electromagnetic radiation that comes from the power cord affects these two
frequencies.
3.2 Spectrum Analyzer and Tracking
Generator
In order to check calibration of the SA, several measurements with the Signal
Hound USB-TG44A tracking generator connected to the SA were made. The
20
Figure 3.7: The setup for checking calibration of the SA.
tracking generator generates signals at RF range 10 Hz to 4.4 GHz with ampli-
tude range from -30 dBm to -10 dBm. The setup of these measurements is shown
in Figure 3.7. All calibration measurements were made in room 4644 located on
4th floor at the National Weather Center (NWC) in Norman, OK. No isolations
from the external EM signals were made.
3.2.1 Tracking Generator’s Frequency 60 kHz
In Figure 3.8, we see power spectrum of the signals that were created by the
setup shown in Figure 3.7. The tracking generator was generating the -30-
dBm signal at 60 kHz (see software window setup in Figure 3.9). In spite of the
statement that the minimum detected frequency is 100 kHz for the USB-SA124A
spectrum analyzer, the highest peak with power equal to -32.14 dBm which the
SA detected is at 60 kHz in Figure 3.8. There are also three of its harmonics:
120 kHz (-76.49-dBm peak power shown as -77.519-dBm peak power in Figure
3.9), 180 kHz (-86.44-dBm peak power shown as about -87-dBm peak power in
21































Y: −76.49 X: 180
Y: −86.44 X: 240
Y: −95.87
Figure 3.8: Power spectrum of signals that were created by setup shown in
Figure 3.7. The tracking generator was generating a signal at 60 kHz.
Figure 3.9), and 240 kHz (-95.87-dBm peak power) in Figure 3.8. The power
spectrum’s values are decreasing with increasing the harmonic’s number which
was expected. The differences in the power spectrum’s values from Figure 3.8
and the power values from Figure 3.9 are caused by the differences in processing
between the output of the standard sweep mode and I and Q data. The center
frequency was 150 kHz. Therefore, there is a peak with power -101.4 dBm at
145.4 kHz in Figure 3.8. This peak has power close to the peak power in Figure
3.4.
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Figure 3.9: Software window setup for the tracking generator which generates
60-kHz signal and the SA which measures it.
3.2.2 Tracking Generator’s Frequency 120 kHz
3.2.2.1 Center Frequency 150 kHz
Figure 3.10 shows the power spectrum when the tracking generator was gen-
erating the -30-dBm signal at 120 kHz (see Software window setup in Figure
3.11). The result is similar to the case when the tracking generator was creating
the signal at 60 kHz. The highest peak with power -30.19 dBm which the SA
detected is at 120 kHz in Figure 3.10. There is also one of its harmonics: 240
kHz (-75.9-dBm peak power) in Figure 3.10. The center frequency was again
150 kHz. Therefore, there is a peak with power -106 dBm at 145.4 kHz in Figure
3.10. This peak power is close to the peak power in Figure 3.4.
23































Figure 3.10: Power spectrum of the signals that were created by setup shown
in Figure 3.7. The tracking generator was generating a signal at 120 kHz.
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Figure 3.11: Software window setup for the tracking generator which generates
120-kHz signal and the SA which measures it.
3.2.2.2 Center Frequency 180 kHz
The last measurement with the tracking generator was when the tracking gener-
ator was generating the -30-dBm signal at 120 kHz (see Software window setup
in Figure 3.12), but the center frequency was 180 kHz. Figure 3.13, shows the
power spectrum for this case. Comparing Figures 3.13 and 3.10, I concluded
that a new peak at 184.5 kHz which is only in Figure 3.13 corresponds to the
center frequency of 180 kHz. And of course, there is no peak at 145.4 kHz in Fig-
ures 3.13. This is one more conformation that, in this SA, any center frequency
produces a peak in the power spectrum.
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Figure 3.12: Software window setup for the tracking generator which generates
120-kHz signal and the SA that measures it, but the center frequency set at
180 kHz.
3.3 Antennas’ Description and Measurement
Challenges
To continue these investigations, antennas were needed for measuring signals
from the laptop. I utilized the Aaronia Near Field Probes (see Figure 3.14)
which were connected to the SA. This is a passive, high performance and accurate
RF Field Probe set that allows straightforward pinpointing and measurement of
interference sources from DC (1 Hz) to 9 GHz in electronic component groups
as well as execution and monitoring of generic EMC measurement. The set
includes a total of 5 probes: 4 probes for magnetic field measurements and one
for measurements of electric fields. All probes are covered with an insulating
layer, thus allowing safe measurement of oscillators or main lines. All of them
26































Figure 3.13: Power spectrum of signals created by setup shown in Figure 3.7.
The tracking generator was generating a signal at 120 kHz, but the center
frequency was at 180 kHz.
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Figure 3.14: The Aaronia Near Field Probes. Image obtained from
http://www.aaronia.com/products/antennas/RF-Field-Probes-PBS1/.
have 50-Ohm nominal impedance 3. I measured electric field with an isotropic E-
field probe. This probe has 9-GHz maximum resonance frequency. The magnetic
field was measured with two probes. One probe has 6-mm sensor diameter and
maximum resonance frequency of more than 6 GHz. The other probe has 50-mm
sensor diameter and 700-MHz maximum resonance frequency.
Unfortunately, I was only able to see the signal of interest with the 50-mm
magnetic field probe, likely because its loop has an area about 10 times large
than the 6-mm sensor. One more measurement challenge was that the signal was
noticed only in one specific location on the keyboard. The probes were moved





CACHE HIT/MISS SIGNALS RADIATED
FROM A LAPTOP COMPUTER
In this Chapter, I establish the kind of signals the cache hit/miss program causes
to emanate from a laptop computer.
4.1 Experiment Setup
The SA was connected to the laptop with software for the spectrum analyzer.
The laptop was connected to the power cord plugged in the room outlet (Room
4644 at the NWC). The output of the SA was connected to the 50-mm magnetic
near field probe. The probe was set at 1 cm above testing laptop’s keyboard (see
Figure 4.1). This laptop was also connected to the power cord which was plugged
in the room outlet. The testing laptop has an Intel i7-6700HQ processor. The
processor runs at 2.6 GHz and has 4 cores, 2 threads per core, a 6-MB 12-way
set associative L3 cache shared by all cores. Each core has a 256-kB L2 cache
and a 32-kB 8-way set associative L1 data cache. A cache hit/miss program was
running on the testing laptop. The description of the program is in Section 2.2.
No isolations from the external EM signals were made. Before running the cache
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Figure 4.1: The setup for cache hit/miss measurements relative to the testing
laptop.
hit/miss program, the new setup needed to be checked for changes in the signals
measured by the SA.
4.1.1 Spectrum Analyzer and Laptop with Software for
the Spectrum Analyzer in a Room
In Figure 4.2, we see the power spectrum of the signals when the laptop from
Figure 4.1 was taken out of room 4644 (see Figure 4.3). There are two peaks one
at 118.3 and the other at 236.5 kHz in Figure 4.2 which are most likely related to
the SA’s internal signals. These values are shifted from the values of 107.2 and
214.3 kHz in Figure 3.4. The main reason for these shifts could be because of the
connection of the SA to the magnetic near-field probe. It is also possible that
the antenna was picking up some radiation from some other sources of radiation.
The peak at 204 kHz corresponds to the center frequency 200 kHz.
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Figure 4.2: Power spectrum of signals created by setup shown in Figure 4.3.
The center frequency was at 200 kHz.
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Figure 4.3: The setup for measurements when laptop from Figure 4.1 was
taken out of the room.
4.1.2 Spectrum Analyzer, Laptop with Software for the
Spectrum Analyzer, and Laptop for Running
Cache Hit/Miss Program
Next measurement was performed when the testing laptop was turned on and
only the operating system (OS) was running (Figure 4.4).
In Figure 4.5, we see the power spectrum for this case. All frequencies that
are different from the frequencies in Figure 4.2, except the central frequency
(peak is at 204 kHz), and signal’s peak power is greater than -100 dBm are
marked in Figure 4.4. There are 118.8 kHz (-96.58-dBm peak power), 152.6
kHz (-90.79-dBm peak power), 272.5 kHz (-94.98-dBm peak power), 277.9 kHz
(-97.19-dBm peak power), and 305.3 kHz (-96.37-dBm peak power). There are
also several peaks which have peak powers less or equal than -100 dBm, but
greater than -103 dBm. These peaks locate at frequencies: between 101.7 and
32
Figure 4.4: The setup for measurements when laptop from Figure 4.1 was idle.
104 kHz with values of the peak powers between -103 and -100.6 dBm, 206.9
kHz (-102-dBm peak power), 237.6 kHz (-102.5-dBm peak power), and 292.9
kHz (-101.7-dBm peak power). The origins of theses frequencies is unknown.
4.2 Cache Hit/Miss Program’s EM Radiation
Several measurements when the cache hit/miss program was creating frequencies
of 175, 180, 185, 650 kHz, and 1.65 MHz were made. The program was running
for 10 min. The centered frequencies were 200 kHz for “program’s frequencies”
(1/T, see detailed explanation in Section 2.2) 175, 180, and 185 kHz, 700 kHz
for “program’s frequency” 650 kHz, and 1.7 MHz for “program frequency” 1.65
MHz.
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Figure 4.5: Power spectrum of signals when the testing laptop was idle. The
center frequency was at 200 kHz.
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Figure 4.6: Power spectrum of signals when testing laptop was running
LDL1/LDL2 instructions at frequency of 175 kHz and performing the cache
hit/miss. The center frequency was at 200 kHz.
4.2.1 Center Frequency 200 kHz
4.2.1.1 Program’s Frequency 175 kHz
In Figure 4.6, the power spectrum of the signals when the testing laptop was
running LDL1/LDL2 instructions at frequency of 175 kHz and performing the
cache hit/miss is presented. The center frequency was 200 kHz. Comparing
Figures 4.5 and 4.6, we see a new peak with the value of the power of -101.6
dBm at frequency 175 kHz. It is exactly the program’s frequency.
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Figure 4.7: Power spectrum of signals when testing laptop was running
LDL1/LDL2 instructions at frequency of 180 kHz and performing the cache
hit/miss. The center frequency was at 200 kHz.
4.2.1.2 Program’s Frequency 180 kHz
Next measurements of the EM leakage were performed at the program’s fre-
quency of 180 kHz, but with the same center frequency (200 kHz). In Figure
4.7, the power spectrum of this leakage is presented. As we see from Figure 4.7,
there is no peak at 175 kHz, but there is a peak with power of -99.53 dBm at
180 kHz. It is one more additional piece of evidence that I am capturing the
program’s frequency.
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Figure 4.8: Power spectrum of signals when testing laptop was running
LDL1/LDL2 instructions at frequency of 185 kHz and performing the cache
hit/miss. The center frequency was at 200 kHz.
4.2.1.3 Program’s Frequency 185 kHz
In this Section, the power spectrum of the signals when the testing laptop was
running LDL1/LDL2 instructions at frequency of 185 kHz is shown. The center
frequency is 200 kHz. As can be seen in Figure 4.8, the peak power of -99.4 dBm
is at 185 kHz and there are no peaks at 175 and 180 kHz. This confirms that
the cache hit/miss program EM leakage has been detected.
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Figure 4.9: Power spectrum of signals when testing laptop was idle. The center
frequency was at 700 kHz.
4.2.2 Center Frequency 700 kHz
4.2.2.1 The Testing Laptop Idle
For an addition experiment, the center frequency is 700 kHz. In order to distin-
guish the signals which related to the cache hit/miss program from other signals,
I measured the EM signals from the testing laptop when only the OS was run-
ning. In Figure 4.9, the power spectrum of these signals is shown. There are
two peaks in Figure 4.9. One is with -101.4-dBm peak power at 610.9 kHz. Its
origin is unknown. The testing peak is with -98.64-dBm peak power at 692.3
kHz related to the center frequency.
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Figure 4.10: Power spectrum of signals when testing laptop was running
LDL1/LDL2 instructions at frequency of 650 kHz and performing the cache
hit/miss. The center frequency was at 700 kHz.
4.2.2.2 Program’s Frequency 650 kHz
After the frequencies under computer idle regime were established, I set up the
cache hit/miss program’s frequency to be 650 kHz. In Figure 4.10, the power
spectrum of the signals for this case is presented. As we can see in Figure 4.10,
there are two peaks above the noise in addition to the center frequency peak.
One peak is -79.71 dBm at 593.4 kHz. Its origin is unknown. The testing peak
is -99.96 dBm at 650 kHz that is the program’s frequency.
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4.2.3 Center Frequency 1.705 MHz
4.2.3.1 Program’s Frequency 1.65 MHz
In order to establish how high the value of the program’s frequency can be, the
program was run in MHz region. The highest frequency that allows program
to run without crashing is 1.65 MHz. From the previous experience (see Sec-
tions 4.2.1 and 4.2.2), the program’s frequency is very pronounced. Therefore,
I skipped the measurements when the testing laptop is idle this time and mea-
sured only the EM leakage from the running cache hit/miss program. In Figure
4.11, the power spectrum of the signals when the testing laptop was running
LDL1/LDL2 instructions at frequency of 1.65 MHz and performing the cache
hit/miss is showed. The center frequency is 1.7 MHz. There are several peaks in
Figure 4.11. The center frequency peak is -105 dBm at 1.705 MHz. One more
peak near the center peak is -98.41 dBm at 1.708 MHz with unknown origin.
The program’s peak is -106.2 dBm at 1.651 MHz. The peak at 1.783 MHz is
also related to the program, but the meaning of that peak is unknown.
4.2.4 Origin of the EM Leakage
The last question addressed in this thesis is where is the origin of the EM leakage?
In Figure 4.12, we see the hardware of the testing laptop. The violet circle
corresponds to the location where the signal of the cache hit/miss EM leakage
has the maximum amplitude. As we see in Figure 4.12, it is on the left side
from the processor. When the antenna moved to the left or right sides from
that location, the magnitude of the signal attenuated rapidly. Therefore, the
processor is the source which creates the EM leakage during execution of the
cache hit/miss program.
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Figure 4.11: Power spectrum of signals when testing laptop was running
LDL1/LDL2 instructions at frequency of 1.65 MHz and performing the cache
hit/miss. The center frequency was at 1.7 MHz.
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The possibility of using electromagnetic signals of modern laptops for stealing
information from them has been explored. For that purpose, five sets of mea-
surements were made: 1) EM signals from the spectrum analyzer by itself, 2)
EM signals of the spectrum analyzer that was fitted by the tracking generator,
3) EM signals from the testing laptop’s location in absence of the laptop mea-
sured with 50-mm magnetic probe which was connected to the SA, 4) similar
to the previous set but the testing laptop was in the room and was turn on, 5)
similar to the previous set but the cache hit/miss program was running on the
testing laptop which was creating an EM leakage. The cache hit/miss program
has two loops: LDL1 and LDL2 with the total period T. Thus, the program was
creating 1/T frequency that was possible to measure with the 50-mm magnetic
probe connected to the SA. I have determined that the frequency measured is
the one that the running program was creating. Therefore, I conclude that it is
possible to detect that a program is running on modern laptops by measuring
their electromagnetic signals.
It is possible to determine the frequency of a periodic program fairly easily. To
determine the actual information content or exchange within the laptop is much
harder to accomplish. For this, one needs to lock onto the internal clock and read
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time series information that is shuffled between registers. This, however, requires
a much more sophisticated set up, possibly including specialized hardware. To
my knowledge, this has not yet been done. Therefore, it can be considered as
topic for future work.
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